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Undressing Naked Economic Protectionism, Rational 
Basis Review, and Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment states that no State shall “deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”1 
The Amendment was a direct response to problems surrounding racial 
discrimination during Reconstruction.2 Since its ratification, however, 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
protected citizens against various forms of discrimination, including 
discrimination based on gender, age, religion, disability, etc.3 
Historically, this provision also protected certain economic liberties by 
disallowing laws that arbitrarily treat similar groups differently,4 or 
different groups similarly.5 Following the New Deal, however, courts 
have granted legislatures a large amount of deference regarding 
economic discrimination laws that classify individuals into different 
groups and then treat the groups differently—often favoring one 
group over another.6 When these laws are challenged under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, courts generally apply the rational basis test.7 
With respect to the rational basis test, the Supreme Court has 
stated that “rational-basis review in equal protection analysis ‘is not a 
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 2. Brianne J. Gorod, Does Lochner Live?: The Disturbing Implications of Craigmiles v. 
Giles, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 537, 537 (2003) (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 50–52 (1999)). 
 3. See, e.g., Amy B. Gendleman, The Equal Protection Clause, the Free Exercise Clause and 
Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (1996). 
 4. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (listing a number of cases 
upholding liberties outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 5. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (“Sometimes the grossest discrimination 
can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike . . . .”). 
 6. See Constitutional Law—Economic Legislation—D.C. Circuit Rejects Challenge to 
Milk Regulation.—Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), reh’g 
en banc denied, No. 11-5065 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1146 (2013) 
[hereinafter Constitutional Law—Economic Legislation]. 
 7. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (applying the rational basis test). 
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choices.’”8 Rather, rational basis review requires a court to uphold a 
law as constitutional “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of 
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”9 While 
courts will often attempt to discern the intent of the legislature and 
adopt it as the appropriate rationale for the law, “the legislature need 
not articulate any reason for enacting its economic regulations.”10 
Courts, therefore, are often left to come up with their own explanation 
or “rational basis” for the law. In fact, courts are even “obligated to 
seek out other conceivable reasons for validating [a state statute].”11 
However, “it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether 
the conceived reason . . . actually motivated the legislature.”12 
In recent years, courts have disagreed about whether one such 
judicially derived rationale—naked economic protectionism (a term 
used to describe a law enacted with the sole purpose of shielding a 
particular group from economic competition)—satisfies the rational 
basis test.13 Part II of this Comment uncovers how courts currently 
analyze naked economic protectionism, Part III discusses why naked 
economic protectionism should not be a sufficient rationale to pass 
rational basis review, Part IV lays out the effects that legitimized naked 
economic protectionism may have on the legislative and judicial 
processes, and Part V concludes. 
 
 8. Id. at 319 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 
 9. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313; see also Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 
(1990); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600–03 (1987); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 
166, 174–79 (1980); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1970). 
 10. Sensational Smiles, L.L.C. v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 11. Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 146 (1st Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); see 
also Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e are obliged to consider 
every plausible legitimate state interest that might support the [state law] . . . .”). 
 12. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (citing Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179). 
 13. Compare Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 286 (“We . . . conclude that economic 
favoritism is rational for purposes of our review of state action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”), and Powers, 379 F.3d at 1221 (“[A]bsent a violation of a specific constitutional 
provision or other federal law, intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a legitimate state 
interest.”), with St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[N]either 
precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic protection of a particular industry 
is a legitimate governmental purpose . . . .”) (footnote omitted), and Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 
F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[M]ere economic protectionism for the sake of economic 
protectionism is irrational with respect to determining if a classification survives rational basis 
review.”), and Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]rotecting a discrete 
interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
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II. CONTEXT AND APPLICATION OF NAKED ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM 
Since 2002, five circuit courts have explicitly addressed naked 
economic protectionism. This Part introduces all five decisions by 
summarizing each court’s analysis and holding regarding naked 
economic protectionism. The three circuits (Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth) 
that invalidated naked economic protectionism as a sufficient rationale 
to satisfy rational basis review under the Fourteenth Amendment are 
addressed first,14 followed by a discussion of the two circuits (Second 
and Tenth) that validated naked economic protectionism as a 
sufficient rationale.15 
A. Decisions Holding that Naked Economic Protectionism is an 
Insufficient Government Purpose to Withstand Equal Protection 
Rational Basis Review 
Three circuit court decisions have explicitly held that naked 
economic protectionism is not a sufficient rationale for passing a law 
under rational basis review. This section summarizes those three cases 
and gives an overview of each court’s analysis and reasoning for their 
respective holdings. 
1. Fifth Circuit: St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille 
In St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, an abbey of the Catholic Church 
challenged rules issued by the Louisiana Board of Funeral Directors, 
which granted funeral homes the exclusive right to sell burial caskets.16 
The abbey had begun selling caskets as a way to provide income to its 
monks.17 While the abbey historically used the caskets only to bury its 
monks, public interest in the caskets increased, in part, because they 
were priced significantly lower than caskets offered by funeral homes.18 
Louisiana law did not regulate the design specifications of caskets, 
nor did it prohibit individuals from creating their own caskets or from 
 
 14. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 222; Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 991 n.15; Craigmiles, 312 
F.3d at 224. 
 15. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 286; Powers, 379 F.3d at 1221. 
 16. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 217. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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purchasing caskets from out of state.19 However, Louisiana law 
restricted intrastate casket sales by requiring a casket retailer to 
become a licensed funeral establishment and employ a full-time funeral 
director.20 Since St. Joseph Abbey did not meet these requirements, 
the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors21 
ordered the abbey not to sell any caskets to the public.22 St. Joseph 
Abbey challenged the rules issued by the board as a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because the rules 
bore no rational relationship to a valid government purpose.23 
The Fifth Circuit sided with St. Joseph Abbey in finding that 
“neither precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic 
protection of a particular industry is a legitimate governmental 
purpose.”24 In reaching this conclusion, the court referenced decisions 
by the Sixth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit.25 In Craigmiles v. Giles, the 
Sixth Circuit struck down a similar Tennessee casket law, holding that 
economic protectionism is not a rational basis for a law.26 In Powers v. 
Harris, on the other hand, the Tenth Circuit upheld an Oklahoma 
casket regulation and held that economic protection of an industry 
(e.g., the funeral home industry), is a valid state interest.27 
The Fifth Circuit was critical of the holding in Powers, and stated 
that “none of the Supreme Court cases Powers cites stands for that 
proposition.”28 The Fifth Circuit articulated that, instead, the 
Supreme Court cases cited in Powers stood for the proposition that 
economic protection of an industry “is not an illegitimate interest 
 
 19. Id. at 217–18. 
 20. See id. at 218; see also LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:831(37)–(39), :842(A), :842(D), 
:848 (2007). 
 21. By law, the nine-member State Board consisted of four licensed funeral directors, four 
licensed embalmers, and one representative who was not affiliated with the funeral industry.  St. 
Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 219; LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:832(A)(2), (B)(1)–(2) (2007). 
 22. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 219. 
 23. Id. at 220. 
 24. Id. at 222. 
 25. Id. at 221–22. 
 26. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). This case will be discussed in 
more detail in Section II.A.2. 
 27. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004). This case will be 
discussed in more detail in Section II.B.2. 
 28. St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 222. 
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when protection of the industry can be linked to advancement of the 
public interest or general welfare.”29 
The Fifth Circuit went on to address other proposed rational bases 
for the casket law, such as consumer protection and public health and 
safety.30 But finding the law related to none of these bases, the court 
concluded that the Louisiana Board of Funeral Director’s 
rules  were  a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.31 
 
2. Sixth Circuit: Craigmiles v. Giles 
 
In Craigmiles v. Giles, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a 
Tennessee law requiring those who sell funeral merchandise to be 
licensed funeral directors was rationally related to any legitimate state 
interest.32 As part of the regulation, the Tennessee Funeral Directors 
and Embalmers Act (FDEA) required that anyone who engaged in 
“funeral directing” be a licensed funeral director by the state board.33 
An amended version of the statute defined “funeral directing” to 
include “the selling of funeral merchandise.”34 
The Tennessee Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers issued 
a cease and desist order to Nathaniel Craigmiles, who operated two 
retail casket stores.35 Craigmiles filed a lawsuit challenging the FDEA 
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 
The Sixth Circuit considered various potential purposes for the 
FDEA, including increased consumer protection and casket quality.37 
However, even though these were legitimate state interests, the court 
found that the law was not related to any of these purposes.38 In fact, 
the court believed that both consumers and casket quality were likely 
worse off as a result of the FDEA.39 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 223–27. 
 31. Id. at 227. 
 32. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-201 (2009); Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222. 
 34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101(6)(A)(ii) (2009); Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222. 
 35. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222–23. 
 36. Id. at 223. 
 37. Id. at 225–28. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. 
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The court then turned to economic protectionism and held that 
the “naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents 
that funeral directors extract from consumers” is an invalid state 
purpose.40 The court further articulated that favoring “certain 
businessmen over others at the expense of consumers is not animated 
by a legitimate governmental purpose and cannot survive even rational 
basis review.”41 Because the FDEA bore no rational relationship to a 
legitimate government purpose, the Sixth Circuit found that the 
application of the FDEA to Craigmiles’ businesses was 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42 
3. Ninth Circuit: Merrifield v. Lockyer 
At issue in Merrifield v. Lockyer was a California law requiring 
anyone engaged in structural pest control to obtain a license through 
the state’s Structural Pest Control Board.43 Alan Merrifield’s business 
was to install mechanical devices, such as wires, screens, or spikes, on 
buildings in order to deter pests like pigeons, raccoons, skunks, and 
rats.44 Merrifield contended that the state’s regulatory scheme was 
intended for pesticide-based pest control, and since he did not use any 
pesticides in his business, he should be exempt from obtaining a pest 
control license.45 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether the 
California regulatory scheme was a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection rights of pest controllers.46 The court 
found that the exemptions to the law, for which Merrifield did not 
qualify, were irrational and “designed to favor economically certain 
constituents at the expense of others similarly situated, such as 
Merrifield.”47 Further, the court stated that “economic protectionism 
for its own sake, regardless of its relation to the common good, cannot 
 
 40. Id. at 228–29. 
 41. Id. at 229. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 8550(a) (West 2008); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 
978, 980 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 44. Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 980. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 991. 
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be said to be in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest.”48 
The court concluded that the state licensing scheme was an 
unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause.49 
B. Decisions Holding that Naked Economic Protectionism is a 
Sufficient Government Purpose to Withstand Equal Protection 
Rational Basis Review 
Two circuit court decisions have explicitly held that naked 
economic protectionism is a sufficient rationale for enacting a law. This 
section summarizes those two cases and gives an overview of the 
courts’ reasoning for their respective holdings. 
1. Second Circuit: Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen 
In Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen,50 the Connecticut State 
Dental Commission issued a ruling that permitted only licensed 
dentists to provide certain teeth whitening procedures.51 Sensational 
Smiles, a non-dentist teeth-whitening business, filed suit and 
specifically challenged a part of the Commission’s ruling that 
prohibited non-licensed dentists from performing a specific teeth-
whitening procedure, which used LED lamps.52 Sensational Smiles 
argued that the rule violated the Equal Protection Clause because no 
rational relationship existed between the rule and a legitimate 
government legitimate interest.53 
The parties agreed that the government had a legitimate interest 
in protecting the public’s oral health.54 They disputed, however, 
whether the Commission’s ruling related to that interest.55 The 
Second Circuit addressed this concern by discussing some plausible 
reasons why the ruling related to the public’s oral health, such as 
 
 48. Id. at 991 n.15. 
 49. Id. at 992. 
 50. 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 51. JEANNE P. STRATHEARN ET AL., CONN. STATE DENTAL COMM’N, DECLARATORY 
RULING: TEETH WHITENING (2011), http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/phho/dental_com
mission/declaratory_rulings/2011_teeth_whitening_declaratory_ruling_-_corrected.pdf; see 
also Sensational Smiles, L.L.C. v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 52. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 283, 283 n.1. 
 53. Id. at 283–84. 
 54. Id. at 284. 
 55. Id. 
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potential harms or health risks resulting from the use of the LED 
lamps that licensed dentists would be better able to treat.56 Sensational 
Smiles argued that dentists are neither trained to use the LED lamps 
nor required to have any knowledge of LED lamps in order to obtain 
a dental license.57 The court rebutted this argument, however, by 
stating that the Commission might have reasoned that if a customer 
experienced side effects from the LED lamp, such as sensitivity or 
burning, a dentist would be better equipped to minimize or treat the 
side effects.58 Additionally, the court stated that the Commission 
might have thought it best that customers receive an 
individualized  oral assessment prior to receiving this type of teeth 
whitening procedure.59 
The court acknowledged that the law was rationally related to the 
government’s legitimate interest in the public’s oral health, and 
therefore valid under the rational basis test.60 However, the court 
extended its opinion by addressing Sensational Smile’s claim that the 
true purpose for the Commission’s rule was to continue the monopoly 
of dental services by licensed dentists.61 
According to the Second Circuit, even if the sole rationale for the 
Dental Commission’s ruling was “to shield licensed dentists from 
competition,” it would not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because “economic favoritism is rational” for purposes of rational basis 
review.62 The court reasoned that naked economic protectionism is a 
legitimate and valid governmental purpose for creating a law because 
of “precedent, principle, and practicalities.”63 
First, the court stated that economic favoritism of all sorts has 
been permitted by a long line of Supreme Court cases.64 Second, the 
 
 56. Id. at 284–85. 
 57. Id. at 285. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 285–86. For a detailed review of the dental monopoly of teeth whitening 
procedures, see ANGELA C. ERICKSON, WHITE OUT: HOW DENTAL INDUSTRY INSIDERS 
THWART COMPETITION FROM TEETH-WHITENING ENTREPRENEURS (2013), https://ij.org
/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/white-out1.pdf. 
 62. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 286. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 286–87; see, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 
(2003) (upholding state tax scheme that favored riverboat gambling over racetrack 
gambling); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (upholding state property tax scheme 
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court reasoned that the principle of separation of powers dictates that 
a state legislature is free to pursue any purpose it chooses so long as 
the purpose is rational, and that it is not for the judiciary to decide 
whether those rational purposes are wise.65 Economic favoritism of 
one group over another, the court points out, is simply a result of 
“politics,” and that “[c]hoosing between competing economic 
theories is the work of state legislatures.”66 
Third, the court recognized that, as a practical matter, it is often 
difficult to distinguish between a protectionist purpose and a more 
legitimate purpose.67 Therefore, without a “consistent way to 
determine acceptable levels of protectionism,” it would be too easy for 
a court to find “improper” economic protectionism if it were intent 
on doing so.68 
The court concluded by holding that “there are any number of 
constitutionally rational grounds for the Commission’s rule, and that 
one of them is the favoring of licensed dentists at the expense of 
unlicensed teeth whiteners.”69 
2. Tenth Circuit: Powers v. Harris 
In Powers v. Harris,70 the Tenth Circuit addressed an Oklahoma 
statute which provided that in order to sell funeral merchandise, 
including caskets, one must be a licensed funeral director operating 
out of a funeral home.71 An Oklahoma corporation designed to sell 
 
that favored long-term owners over new owners); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 
(1976) (upholding New Orleans city ordinance that banned street vendors, with an exception 
made for existing vendors in operation for more than eight years); Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1955) (upholding regulation that prohibited “any 
person purporting to do eye examination or visual care to occupy space in [a] retail store”). As 
I will attempt to demonstrate in infra Section III.A, however, each of these U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions also failed to rely exclusively on the idea of naked economic protectionism as the basis 
for upholding their respective laws. 
 65. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 287. 
 66. Id. In infra Section III.B.2, I will address this point in more detail by discussing the 
difference between protectionism as the basis for a law and protectionism as the result of a law. 
 67. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 287. 
 68. Id. This line of reasoning will be addressed throughout infra Part III. 
 69. Id. at 288. 
 70. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 71. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 396.3a, 396.6(A) (West 2010). 
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funeral merchandise over the Internet challenged the law as a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 
As part of its argument, the corporation claimed that the license 
required to be a funeral director was irrelevant to the online sale of 
caskets.73 On this point, the district court agreed.74 However, even 
though the court found that the funeral director licensing 
requirement was unrelated to the business of online casket sales, the 
district court concluded that the funeral-licensing scheme furthered 
another state interest in consumer protection75—an interest which the 
parties had previously conceded was a legitimate state interest.76   
On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit discussed naked economic 
protectionism, as the court was “obliged to consider every plausible 
legitimate state interest” in support of the law.77 In its discussion of 
naked economic protectionism, the Tenth Circuit referenced three 
decisions that held that economic protectionism is not a legitimate 
governmental interest,78 but stated that each of those courts were 
misguided by precedent that was directed at violations of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, not the illegitimacy of economic protectionism.79  
The Tenth Circuit also addressed Craigmiles v. Giles—a Sixth 
Circuit case striking down a nearly identical statute as a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause—describing it as too narrowly focused 
on the stated intent of the legislature, rather than putting forward 
every conceivable legitimate interest that may have motivated the 
 
 72. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1213, 1215 (“[The Corporation] contend[s], as a matter of equal 
protection, that the [law] is unconstitutional because the Board is ‘arbitrarily treating similarly-
situated people differently, and . . . arbitrarily treating differently-situated people the same.’”) 
(citing Opening Brief of Appellants Kim Powers, Dennis Bridges, and Memorial Concepts 
Online, Inc. at 24, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-6014), 2003 WL 
24305240, at *24). 
 73. Id. at 1213. 
 74. Id. at 1213–14 (quoting Powers v. Harris, No. CIV–01–445–F, 2002 WL 32026155, 
at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002), aff’d, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
 75. See Powers, 2002 WL 32026155, at *3–7, aff’d, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 76. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1215. 
 77. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218; see also Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 146 
(1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]his Court is obligated to seek out other conceivable reasons for validating 
[a state statute].”). 
 78. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218 (citing Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 
2002)); Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1117 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Santos v. City of 
Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1994)). 
 79. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218–20. 
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legislature.80 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court as precedent, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the Oklahoma statute also related to the “legitimate 
state interest” of “intrastate economic protectionism.”81 
III. NAKED ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM’S INSUFFICIENT 
JUSTIFICATION 
The Sensational Smiles court recognized “the difficulty in 
distinguishing between a protectionist purpose and a more 
‘legitimate’ public purpose in any particular case,” and that “[o]ften, 
the two will coexist.”82 While courts may experience difficulty in 
distinguish between a (more) legitimate purpose and a protectionist 
purpose, judicial struggle does not justify the creation of a new 
legitimate purpose—naked economic protectionism. The rationale in 
favor of legitimizing naked economic protectionism is insufficient 
because it relies on weak interpretation of precedent, is virtually 
impossible to negate, and does not align with the public nature of 
other legitimate government purposes under rational basis review. 
A. Naked Economic Protectionism’s Weak Precedent and Legal Fiction 
The Second and Tenth Circuit decisions relied on precedent that 
should not have led them to conclude that naked economic 
protectionism is a legitimate state interest that, standing alone, should 
pass the rational basis test. This section discusses the Supreme Court 
decisions the Second and Tenth Circuits relied on in reaching their 
conclusions. It attempts to point out that in each of these Supreme 
Court cases, the law under consideration was either not economic 
protectionist, or the law was upheld under a legitimate government 
interest other than naked economic protectionism. The Second and 
Tenth Circuits relied on many of the same cases; this section addresses 
those cases in the order they were cited by the Sensational 
Smiles court. 
In the first decision cited by the Sensational Smiles court, 
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, the Supreme Court upheld 
a state tax law that increased the tax rate for racetrack slot machine 
 
 80. Id. at 1223. 
 81. Id. at 1220. Most of the U.S. Supreme Court cases cited by the Tenth Circuit in 
support of this holding are identical to those cited by the Sensational Smiles court, and will be 
addressed in Section III.A. 
 82. Sensational Smiles, L.L.C. v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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operators to thirty-six percent, while leaving the tax rate for riverboat 
slot machine operators at twenty percent.83 The Court considered 
plausible rationales for the law “aside from simply aiding the financial 
position of the riverboats,” including the legislature’s desire “to 
encourage the economic development of river communities or to 
promote riverboat history, say, by providing incentives for riverboats 
to remain in the State, rather than relocate to other States,” or “to 
protect the reliance interests of riverboat operators, whose adjusted 
slot machine revenue had previously been taxed at the 20 percent 
rate.”84 In other words, the Court did not rely exclusively on naked 
economic protectionism of the riverboats to uphold the law, but 
rather, hypothesized other rationales that the legislature could have 
used when creating the law. 
Sensational Smiles also cited Nordlinger v. Hahn, in which the 
Supreme Court upheld a state property tax scheme favoring long-term 
property owners over new property owners by basing the property tax 
on the value of the property at the time it was acquired rather than 
the current value of the property.85 This is unlike the naked economic 
protectionism discussed in Sensational Smiles or Powers, because the 
property tax scheme did not protect certain groups from “economic 
competition.” Further, the Nordlinger Court stated that the property 
tax scheme might not be considered discriminatory (i.e., 
protectionist) at all, since the law “d[id] not discriminate with respect 
to either the tax rate or the annual rate of adjustment in assessments,” 
but only “the basis on which their property is initially assessed.”86 
Because of the lack of economic protectionism in Nordlinger, the 
Sensational Smiles and Powers courts incorrectly cited Nordlinger as 
validating economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest.   
In addition to classifying the law as nondiscriminatory, the 
Nordlinger Court highlighted several legitimate, non-protectionist 
state interests for the tax scheme. The first of these was “a legitimate 
interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and 
stability,”87 such that “[t]he State therefore legitimately can decide to 
structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership of 
 
 83. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 105 (2003). 
 84. Id. at 109 (emphasis added). 
  85. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 86. Id. at 12. 
 87. Id. (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
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homes and businesses.”88 Second, “the State legitimately can conclude 
that a new owner at the time of acquiring his property does not have 
the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher taxes 
as does an existing owner.”89 In other words, the Nordlinger Court 
did not establish naked economic protectionism as a rational basis for 
state statutes. Rather, it characterized the law it upheld as 
nondiscriminatory and identified other rational bases the legislature 
could have contemplated when enacting the law. 
In New Orleans v. Dukes, another case relied on by both 
Sensational Smiles and Powers, the Supreme Court upheld a New 
Orleans ordinance that effectively banned street vendors who had not 
continuously operated for at least eight years.90 Although this 
ordinance is similar to the statutes upheld in Sensational Smiles and 
Powers, the New Orleans Court did not rely on naked economic 
protectionism as the basis for upholding the law. Instead, the Court 
proposed that the legislature could have contemplated certain 
legitimate state interests other than protecting the older street vendors 
from economic competition.91 One such legitimate reason could be 
“to preserve the appearance and custom valued by the Quarter’s 
residents and attractive to tourists.”92 The Court acknowledged that 
the legislature may have reasoned that the newer vendors “tend to 
interfere with the charm and beauty of a historic area and disturb 
tourists and disrupt their enjoyment of that charm and beauty,”93 while 
the veteran vendors may have “themselves become part of the 
distinctive character and charm that distinguishes” the French 
Quarter.94 Again, the Court did not uphold the law on protectionist 
grounds, but identified other legitimate legislative purposes, that 
would have survived rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Finally, Sensational Smiles and Powers cited Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Oklahoma Inc., in which the Supreme Court upheld a state 
regulation that prohibited anyone purporting to do eye examinations 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976). 
 91. Id. at 304–05. 
 92. Id. at 304 (citing Dukes v. City of New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 709 (1974), rev’d, 
427 U.S. 297 (1976)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 305. 
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or visual care from occupying commercial retail space.95 The practical 
effect of this law was to prevent opticians from suppling lenses or 
fitting old glasses into new frames without a prescription from an 
ophthalmologist or optometrist, making certain portions of opticians’ 
business subject to ophthalmologists and optometrists.96 Even though 
the state legislature was almost certainly motivated by a desire to 
protect the economic interests of optometrists,97 the Court speculated 
as to other rationales for the regulation apart from protecting 
ophthalmologists and optometrists from economic competition.98 The 
Court discussed a number of legitimate purposes centering on the 
perceived public interest in eye examinations, and that an eye 
examination was needed often enough to require one in every case 
where someone wants new eyeglass frames or new lenses.99 
Additionally, the Court suggested that the regulation could have been 
“an attempt to free the profession, to as great an extent as possible, 
from all taints of commercialism.”100  
Similar to the cases discussed previously, the Williamson Court did 
not rely on economic protectionism as the sole rationale for upholding 
the statute under rational basis review. Rather, it put forth other 
possible legitimate government interests which could have withstood 
rational basis review. 
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court either stated that the 
law was not discriminatory (i.e., not protectionist), or identified 
potential rationales other than naked economic protectionism that 
were sufficient to uphold the respective laws. 
The Sensational Smiles court and the Powers court also discussed 
other legitimate government purposes on which they could have, or 
did, uphold the laws they considered.101 Unfortunately, both courts 
unnecessarily extended their opinions to discuss naked economic 
protectionism. As the concurring opinion in Powers states, “[w]hile 
relying on [cited] authorities, the majority goes well beyond them to 
 
 95. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1955). 
 96. Id. at 486. 
 97. See Chris M. Franchetti, Not Seeing Eye to Eye: Chapter 8 and the Battle Over 
Prescription Eyewear, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 474, 489 (1999). 
 98. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88. 
 99. Id. at 487. 
 100. Id. at 491. 
 101. See supra Section II.B. 
167  Undressing Naked Economic Protectionism 
 181 
confer legitimacy to a broad concept not argued . . . - unvarnished 
economic protectionism.”102 
Even though the Sensational Smiles and Powers courts ultimately 
legitimized naked economic protectionism as a valid government 
purpose, they did so by relying on precedent that did not fully support 
naked economic protectionism as a rational basis for a law. That 
precedent identified other reliable rationales to justify the challenged 
laws. The Sensational Smiles and Powers courts unnecessarily 
legitimized naked economic protectionism—both courts had already 
identified other well-accepted rational bases for upholding the laws 
under consideration. This demonstrates that naked economic 
protectionism has never really been tested as the sole government 
purpose under rational basis review, thus creating a legal fiction. The 
Sensational Smiles and Powers decisions only perpetuate this legal 
fiction by unnecessarily discussing and validating naked economic 
protectionism as an acceptable government purpose under rational 
basis review. 
B. Logical Arguments Against Naked Economic Protectionism as a 
Legitimate Government Interest 
1. Naked Economic Protectionism is Virtually Impossible to Negate 
Even though the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was a 
response to problems surrounding Reconstruction, the Amendment’s 
broad equal protection language made it applicable outside the 
context of race.103 This leads to a paradox stemming from a literal 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: “Since virtually all 
legislation creates classifications, and classifications almost necessarily 
entail differential treatment between groups, broad, literal application 
of the Amendment would invalidate nearly all legislation.”104 These 
inevitable legislative classifications provide that “[t]here are winners 
 
 102. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
The concurring opinion and its rationale will be discussed more thoroughly in Section III. 
 103. Gorod, supra note 2, at 537 (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 50–52 (1999)); see also Richard B. 
Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 
88 KY. L.J. 591, 599–601 (2000). 
 104. Gorod, supra note 2, at 537 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
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and losers in virtually all legislation.”105 Of course, not every law is 
invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal 
Protection Clause was not enacted to mitigate all such discrepancies. 
Neither is it the role of the courts to lessen the blow to all 
disfavored groups. 
The framework used by courts today to analyze equal protection 
claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment has been used for 
over forty years.106 The varying levels of judicial scrutiny provide 
different levels of protection, depending on the type of classification 
created by the law. The reviewing court will usually choose one of 
three standards of review: (1) rational basis scrutiny, (2) intermediate 
scrutiny, or (3) strict scrutiny.107 An economic rights claim arising 
under the Equal Protection Clause is subject to rational basis review,108 
the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. 
Rational basis review is a very low threshold for upholding a law, 
and “a paradigm of judicial restraint.”109 In the majority of cases, 
courts give extreme deference to the legislature, since the court is only 
concerned with whether the law rationally relates to some legitimate 
government purpose. As Richard B. Saphire put it, the judge is 
merely asking: 
Given the information that was actually before the 
legislature, or information that might have been available to 
the legislature, or information which the legislature 
reasonably might have thought existed, or information of 
which the court can take judicial notice, could the 
legislature conceivably have believed (not did it actually 
believe) that this statute would or might, even if only in the 
most remote or tenuous way, further or promote a 
legitimate actual or hypothetical goal?110 
At the same time, the court avoids questions like: 
 
 105. Constitutional Law—Economic Legislation, supra note 6, at 1153. 
 106. See Saphire, supra note 103, at 595–96. 
 107. Id. at 596. 
 108. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (“[A] classification neither involving 
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of 
validity. Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational 
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 109. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). 
 110. Saphire, supra note 103, at 606. 
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(1) whether the classification represented a good, wise, or 
sensible way to further a legislative goal; (2) whether the 
statute was an effective or efficient way to further a 
legislative goal, or whether, in a qualitative or quantitative 
sense, the statute was “reasonable”; (3) whether there were 
other ways to further relevant legislative goals that would 
have imposed less restriction on the individual interests 
implicated by the statute; and (4) whether, given the 
information available to the court, the judge could conclude 
independently that the statute was a rational way to further 
a legislative goal.111 
Richard H. Fallon considered rational basis review so deferential 
that he described it as a “virtual rubber stamp.”112 Emphasizing the 
broad judicial deference in rational basis review, Gerald Gunther, in 
one of the more influential discussions on modern equal protection, 
described rational basis review as “virtual judicial abdication.”113 
When courts give naked economic protectionism their stamp of 
approval, judicial abdication is at an all-time high. If protecting a 
favored group from intrastate economic competition is a legitimate 
government interest under rational basis review, virtually all legislation 
affecting the state’s economics could satisfy the Equal Protection 
Clause. Since every piece of legislation favors one group over 
another,114 a court can legitimize legislation by simply hypothesizing 
that the legislature intended to protect the favored group from the 
economic competition of non-favored groups (even if the legislature 
was motivated by something else115). Stated another way, naked 
economic protectionism is virtually impossible to negate 
or “negative.”116 
 
 111. Id. at 605–06 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 112. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 79 (1997). 
 113. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
19 (1972). 
 114. See Constitutional Law—Economic Legislation, supra note 6, at 1153. 
 115. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
 116. See id. For a law to be deemed unconstitutional under rational basis review, “those 
attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every 
conceivable basis which might support it.’” Id. (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts 
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
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Of course, legislation aimed at disfavoring or punishing a certain 
classification due to the legislature’s irrational dislike or hatred for the 
group will not pass constitutional muster. This issue was most 
prominently addressed in Lawrence v. Texas.117 In Lawrence, the 
Supreme Court found that a Texas law criminalizing “deviate sexual 
intercourse with another individual of the same sex” was 
unconstitutional because the state singled out one identifiable class of 
citizens for punishment that did not apply to everyone else.118 While 
the discrimination employed by this Texas law differs in some respects 
from the economic discrimination discussed in this Comment, the 
equal protection analysis is worth noting, as it could foreshadow 
analysis for economic discrimination laws enacted due to legislative 
animus—an issue which has yet to be fully explored. In one similarity, 
for example, Justice O’Connor reemphasized that “a bare . . . desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group,”119 including “moral 
disapproval” of the group, is not a legitimate state interest under 
rational basis review.120 Further, because the law exhibited a “desire to 
harm” an unpopular group, the Court applied a “more searching form 
of rational basis review.”121 While not specifically addressing economic 
liberties, the Court emphasized that “legal classifications must not be 
‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by 
the law.’”122 
Again, the issue of legislative animus has not been fully explored 
in the economic context, but if analyzed in a similar way to the animus 
discussed in Lawrence, economic discrimination due to legislative 
animus would likely be an exception to the nearly blanket-approval 
that would follow a legitimized naked economic protectionism.  
While legislative animus toward a certain group may be grounds 
for striking down certain economic legislation, if courts recognize 
naked economic protectionism as a legitimate government interest, it 
is nearly impossible to show that the legislature was not merely 
protecting an economically favored group—even if it was intent on 
harming a certain group economically. Since some groups always 
benefit more than others from economic legislation, in order to avoid 
 
 117. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 118. Id. at 581–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. at 580 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 120. Id. at 582. 
 121. Id. at 580. 
 122. Id. at 583 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
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Lawrence animus and withstand rational basis review, a court would 
simply need to hypothesize that the statute was intended to favor a 
benefitted group. The law would withstand rational basis review and 
be nearly impossible to negate. 
2. The Public Nature of Legitimate Government Purposes 
In Powers v. Harris, Judge Tymkovich points out in his concurring 
opinion that the Supreme Court has always found that a legitimate 
government interest must advance the public good.123 Even though 
the Sensational Smiles and Powers courts legitimized naked economic 
protectionism, those courts relied on precedent that did not fully 
support such limited economic protectionism.124 Rather, Sensational 
Smiles and Powers relied on Supreme Court cases that upheld 
seemingly protectionist laws because the laws also served other, more 
legitimate public purposes.125 For example, in Fitzgerald v. Racing 
Ass’n of Central Iowa, where an Iowa tax law favored riverboat 
gambling over racetrack gambling, the Court upheld the tax law 
because it served the public purpose of encouraging economic 
development of river communities.126 Similarly, in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 
the Supreme Court found that a California tax law favoring long-term 
property owners over new property owners served a public purpose in 
neighborhood preservation, continuity, stability, and in protecting 
reliance interests.127 When a New Orleans ordinance effectively banned 
newer street vendors, the Court in New Orleans v. Dukes identified 
historical preservation and tourism attraction as acceptable public 
purposes.128 Consumer safety and health interests are also common 
public interests, such as those described in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
when an Oklahoma law subjected portions of opticians’ business to 
ophthalmologists and optometrists.129 Judge Tymkovich’s concurring 
opinion in Powers, summarizes this principle even more boldly: “None 
of these cases overturned the principle that the Equal Protection 
 
 123. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1225–26 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tymkovich, J., 
concurring) (“Rather than hold that a government may always favor one economic actor over 
another, the Court, if anything, insisted that the legislation advance some public good.”). 
 124. See supra Section III.A. 
 125. See supra Section III.A. 
 126. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003). 
 127. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992). 
 128. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
 129. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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Clause prohibits invidious state interests; to the contrary, they ratified 
the principle.”130 
Courts have not yet determined how general a purpose must be 
in order to advance the public good. Because the rational basis inquiry 
is highly fact specific, it is unlikely that courts will adopt a bright line 
definition. For example, the public purposes articulated in Lee Optical 
(consumer protection, safety, and health), may be more general than 
the public purposes articulated in Fitzgerald (economic development 
of river communities). Stated another way, since those who may be in 
the market for optics is a less concentrated group than those who live 
along a river community, a consumer protection law aimed at 
protecting those in the market for optics is much less likely to be 
considered rent-seeking legislation than a law aimed at enhancing 
economic development for those who may live or work along a river 
community. Rent-seeking legislation, or legislation lobbied by a 
concentrated interest group, is more likely to serve the interests of the 
concentrated group over those of the general public. Therefore, rent-
seeking legislation is often synonymous with naked economic 
protectionism, and because of its concentrated benefits, should be less 
likely to qualify as a legitimate government interest. 
However, a law does not necessarily become naked economic 
protectionism simply because it results in some economic protection 
to a classified group—the legislation could result in other public 
benefits. For example, urban revitalization legislation may protect 
certain local businesses economically, but may also make 
neighborhoods safer, spur economic growth in the area, attract 
tourism, increase tax revenues, etc. These more public benefits may 
accrue either during or after the economic protection of the local 
businesses, but as long as some basis for the law is legitimately dressed 
as a public benefit, the economic protection ceases to be “naked.” If, 
however, the only potential basis for a law is to shield a certain 
category of local businesses from economic competition with no 
public benefit (either simultaneous or subsequent), the economic 
protection is “naked” because it is not covered by a public purpose, 
and therefore should not be considered a legitimate government 
purpose. Instead, only those laws that serve a general public interest—
 
 130. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) 
(citing Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88; Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 123; City of New Orleans, 427 
U.S 297; Nordlinger, 505 U.S. 1). 
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not merely the narrow, economic interests of a preselected group—
should be deemed legitimate.  
IV. EFFECTS OF PURE NAKED ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM 
If rational basis review is already so easy to satisfy, why does it 
matter if courts consider naked economic protectionism a legitimate 
rationale for legislation? While rational basis review is not a demanding 
standard, recognizing naked economic protectionism as a legitimate 
government interest, further dilutes rational basis review until it is no 
standard at all. Effectively, courts would rubber-stamp nearly every 
piece of economic legislation challenged under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 
Naked economic protectionism will also present a variety of 
problems in the context of occupational licensing. Many equal 
protection claims arise from occupational licensing requirements, such 
as those for doctors,131 dentists,132 attorneys,133 taxicabs,134 funeral 
directors,135 pest controllers,136 cosmetologists,137 and florists.138 These 
occupational licensing requirements are a form of classification that 
treats the licensed professional differently than unlicensed 
practitioners. A legitimized naked economic protectionism presents 
problems when the licensing qualifications are unrelated to a certain 
specialty. When naked economic protectionism qualifies as a valid 
governmental interest, legislatures can protect interest groups, such as 
licensed professionals, from economic competition, even in areas 
outside the licensed professional’s specialty. 
For example, as discussed previously,139 the court in Powers v. 
Harris examined an Oklahoma law forbidding the sale of caskets 
 
 131. E.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
 132. E.g., Sensational Smiles, L.L.C. v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 133. E.g., Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
 134. E.g., Greater Hous. Small Taxicab Co. Owners Ass’n v. City of Hous., 660 F.3d 
235 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 135. E.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013); Powers, 379 F.3d 
1208; Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 136. E.g., Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 137. E.g., Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
 138. E.g., Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as moot, 
Meadows v. Odom, 198 Fed. App’x 348 (5th Cir. 2006).  
 139. See supra Section II.B. 
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except by licensed funeral directors.140 However, ninety-five percent of 
funeral directors’ licensing requirements were wholly unrelated to the 
sale of caskets.141 Legislators, therefore, were able to protect licensed 
funeral directors, a special interest group, from economic competition 
in an area outside their specialty (casket sales) by distancing the 
occupational licensing requirements from the actual occupation 
being protected. 
Cornwell v. Hamilton provides another example where 
practitioners of a certain skillset were required to obtain an 
occupational license even though the occupational licensing 
requirements were unrelated to the specialty skillset.142 In this case, 
African hair braiders challenged California’s cosmetology licensing 
requirement claiming that it treated persons with different skills as if 
their professions were one and the same.143 In essence, the 
occupational licensing requirements in California protected licensed 
professionals from the economic competition of those who were likely 
more experienced and more skilled practitioners. The court held that 
the cosmetology licensing requirement was a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because “just over six percent of the 
curriculum [was] relevant . . . [to] a would-be African hair braider.”144 
While the law in this case was ruled a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the licensing examination and cosmetology 
requirements were not rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose, if the court had allowed the legislature to engage in naked 
economic protectionism at the time,145 the court could easily have 
upheld the law on the basis that it was meant to protect licensed 
cosmetologists from the economic competition of African hair 
braiders. With naked economic protectionism as a valid governmental 
interest, legislatures could pass a law requiring would-be African hair 
braiders to attend cosmetology school and pass an exam, ninety-four 
percent of which covers material that an African hair braider would 
never use in practice.146  
 
 140. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1213. 
 141. Id. at 1213–14; see supra Section II.B. and text accompanying note 72. 
 142. See Cornwell, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1111. 
 145. Naked economic protectionism was later explicitly ruled invalid by the Ninth Circuit 
in Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 146. Cornwell, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 (“[R]equiring a would-be African hair braider to 
attend a school of cosmetology is irrational and certainly unreasonable.”). 
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This type of law not only seems unfair to the would-be African 
hair braiders, but it also harms the public by limiting access to the 
most experienced and skilled practitioners. A legitimized naked 
economic protectionism would unnecessarily prevent some of the 
most skilled practitioners from working in their fields, and in turn, 
would harm the general public by reducing access to the services of 
those skilled practitioners. 
The law at question in Meadows v. Oldham provides another 
example of how naked economic protectionism rewards rent-seeking 
and limits public access to the services of skilled workers.147 In this 
case, a federal district court upheld Louisiana’s licensing requirements 
for florists.148 The law required prospective florists to obtain a license, 
which required a one-hour written exam and a four-hour practice 
exam graded on subjective factors, such as “scale,” “harmony,” 
“accent,” and “unity.”149 Sandy Meadows, a widow, found a job in a 
floral department at a supermarket.150 She worked as a florist for nine 
years and was so proficient at creating floral arrangements that she was 
put in charge of the supermarket’s floral department.151 However, she 
was never able to pass the florist licensing exam.152  
At trial, Meadows presented extensive evidence showing that the 
law was enacted to protect established florists from new 
competition.153 The evidence included testimony from the state’s 
Commissioner of Agriculture and Chairman of the Louisiana 
Horticulture Commission, who said he had committed to florists 
when he ran for office that he would support florist licensing.154 While 
the knowledge required to obtain a florist license was not entirely 
irrelevant to the profession (as it was in Powers and Cornwell), 
testimony about the procedure for obtaining a license evidenced a 
 
 147.  Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as moot, 
Meadows v. Odom, 198 Fed. App’x 348 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 148. See id. 
 149. Timothy Sandefur, Insiders, Outsiders, and the American Dream: How Certificate of 
Necessity Laws Harm Our Society’s Values, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 381, 
401 (2012). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 401–02 (citing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 29–30, Meadows v. Odom, No. 03–960 (M.D. La. Dec. 
28, 2004)). 
 154. Id. 
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protectionist agenda.155 The procedure for obtaining a license 
included testing where “licensed florists . . . [sat] in judgment of the 
very people who wish[ed] to compete against them.”156 Nonetheless, 
the court upheld the law as “rationally related to the state’s desire that 
floral arrangements will be assembled properly in a manner least likely 
to cause injury to a consumer and will be prepared in a proper, cost 
efficient manner.”157 While naked economic protectionism was not the 
sole grounds for upholding the law,158 Meadows shows how legitimized 
naked economic protectionism could limit the public’s access to the 
most skilled workers.  
Additionally, this type of protectionist, rent-seeking legislation 
would become more prevalent if naked economic protectionism were 
considered a legitimate government interest under rational basis 
review. Indeed, judicial recognition of naked economic protectionism 
as a valid basis for statutes would encourage more rent-seeking 
legislation. As Judge Janice Rogers Brown writes: 
The practical effect of rational basis review of economic 
regulation is the absence of any check on the group interests 
that all too often control the democratic process. It allows 
the legislature free rein to subjugate the common good and 
individual liberty to the electoral calculus of politicians, the 
whim of majorities, or the self-interest of factions.159 
Even though, as Judge Brown points out, rent-seeking is prevalent in 
much of today’s economic legislation, rational basis review is still 
extremely deferential to economic legislation. Recognizing naked 
economic protectionism as a judicially endorsed rationale for creating 
 
 155. Let a Thousand Florists Bloom: Uprooting Outrageous Licensing Laws in Louisiana, 
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 157. See id. 
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a law would only loosen the free rein already afforded legislatures at 
the expense of the common good. 
Courts and lawmakers should consider at what point reduced 
competition harms consumers, and at what point the protection of 
interest groups harms the public interest or general welfare. For 
example, funeral directors may benefit from economic protection, but 
suppressing competition may lead to a decrease in funeral-casket 
quality and selection, which harms consumers. Or cosmetologists may 
benefit from reduced economic competition of African hair braiders, 
but the public is harmed by limited access to the most skilled workers 
because cosmetologists may not be the best African hair braiders. 
Similarly, while dentists may benefit from laws prohibiting non-
dentists from performing teeth whitening procedures, the public sees 
a substantial price increase on routine dental examinations. Or, in a 
more dramatic, real-life example, Sandy Meadows, the manager of the 
floral department in the Meadows, lost her job of nine years and was 
unable to regain employment, relegating her to poverty-like 
conditions and severe health problems.160 As these examples illustrate, 
there is a point where naked economic overprotection of rent-seeking 
interest groups harms the public by decreasing access to skilled 
workers, increasing prices, decreasing service and product selection, 
and erecting barriers to earning a living. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the only plausible rationale for a law is to protect a certain group 
from economic competition, the law should not be upheld. The 
Fourteenth Amendment states that the government cannot deny to 
any person the equal protection of the laws. When the legislature 
denies one person certain economic liberties but grants those same 
economic liberties to another similarly situated person, and there is no 
rational basis for the classification, equal protection of the law has been 
denied, and the classification is a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. On the other hand, if there is 
some rational basis for the law, including some legitimate government 
 
 160. See Sandefur, supra note 149, at 402–03; Let a Thousand Florists Bloom: Uprooting 
Outrageous Licensing Laws in Louisiana, supra note 155; Remarks of Clark Neily at a book 
forum discussing The Right to Earn a Living, CATO INST. (Sept. 20, 2010), 
http://www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=7312. 
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interest, the law does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
should be upheld. 
Finding some rational basis for economic legislation is a very low 
threshold; however, naked economic protectionism should not be a 
rational basis for law because (1) Supreme Court precedent is weak 
and untested when it comes to naked economic protectionism, (2) 
naked economic protectionism is virtually impossible to negate, and 
(3) a rational basis for a law should include a government interest that 
serves (to some extent) the public good, not simply the group 
receiving economic protection. 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed naked economic 
protectionism as a rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause. 
In each decision where the Court upheld economic legislation that 
resulted in an economic benefit to a certain group, the Court upheld 
the law on other, legitimate rational bases—not naked economic 
protectionism. Even in the two circuit court decisions that explicitly 
legitimize naked economic protectionism, the courts relied on some 
rationale apart from mere economic protectionism of a certain group. 
Therefore, naked economic protectionism as a rational basis is, for the 
time being, a legal fiction that has not been tested as an exclusive basis 
for upholding a law.  
Naked economic protectionism is virtually impossible to negate. 
Since every piece of legislation favors some group over another, and 
courts only need to find some possible reason that the legislature 
enacted the law, courts could simply hypothesize that the economic 
legislation was enacted to protect the benefited group. This protection 
does not even need to be the actual purpose for which the legislature 
enacted the statute, nor does the law need to show any sign of 
effectuating that purpose. Barring the potential for legislative animus 
against the disfavored group, naked economic protectionism is 
virtually impossible to negate. 
Rational basis review should include a government interest that 
serves, at least to some extent, the public interest or the general 
welfare. In the decisions discussed in this Comment, there is no 
precedent established for upholding economic legislation that lacks 
some strand of public interest. Rational basis review provides a low 
threshold, and the possibilities for a legitimate public interest are 
many, including consumer protection, consumer safety, public health, 
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economic development, neighborhood preservation, protecting 
reliance interests, historical preservation, and tourism attraction. 
While otherwise publicly minded laws may result in the economic 
protection of certain groups, economic protectionism should not 
stand as the sole basis for enacting a law. 
Legitimizing naked economic protectionism as a rational basis for 
enacting a law may seriously harm the general public. For example, we 
may see occupational licensing requirements protect certain 
professions from economic competition in areas where the licensed 
professional is not specialized, the most skilled, or even qualified. 
These unfounded protections harm the public by reducing supply, 
choice, and quality. Courts should not uphold a law when the only 
basis for the law is naked economic protectionism. 
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